values

leaving your human rights behind

UPDATED

Original letter:

Dear David Cameron

The following two comments have been brought to my attention, I wonder if you could clarify them for me.

1. On the Politics show recently you expressed your belief that 'The moment a burglar steps over your threshold and invades your property ... I think they leave their human rights outside.’ In terms of international law, you are of course wrong, as I am sure you are aware. Until you succeed in your aim of abolishing the Human Rights Act, you are also wrong in terms of national law. Were you therefore expressing a personal desire for international law (as well as national law) to be changed in this respect; and if so, could you clarify which rights you think the burglar should 'leave behind'?

In Cameron's Britain, for example, would it be legal (and acceptable) to kill or subject to torture a petty thief if he/she crosses the threshold of your home? If not killing and torture, where would you draw the line? Perhaps you are suggesting that such people should lose their right to a fair trial, their right to be presumed innocent before being found guilty?

2. You illustrated the 'strange decisions' that the Human Rights Act has given rise to by the following example: 'For instance, you get the decision to give the prisoner hard core pornography. If you had a British Bill of Rights that had more common sense written into it, you could probably avoid having some of these things happening.'

I am surprised that your researchers have not bothered to correct you on this score and indeed that you yourself might actually believe this to be a plausible example of the HRA's effects. Dennis Nilson did indeed try to bring a claim to use the HRA to demand access to pornographic magazines but as you should know, the High Court rejected his claim. It is precisely an example of the 'common sense' nature of the Human Rights Act that it does not entitle prisoners to access hard core pornography.

If you really think there needs to be a serious debate about human rights in the UK and elsewhere, a rethinking of centuries of legal, ethical and political thought, then let us at least have this debate without resorting to falsehoods and propaganda. If it is indeed your view that human rights should no longer be regarded as universal, indivisible and inalienable, in contradistinction to international agreement and international law; and if you would be happy to withdraw this country's previous consent to those principles, then we should let the world and the country know. But letting people know in the context of a false debate about what human rights in fact mean and where they come from is doing human beings in this country and elsewhere no service at all.

I would be grateful if you could respond specifically to my questions about your comments, rather than providing me with a blanket statement on Conservative Party policy.

Thank you for your attention.

antarchi\

gordon's values

Gordon Brown has put up some revealing archive films on the Downing Street website. If we had any illusions that we currently had a Labour Party prime minister ensconced in Downing Street, possessing even an inkling of labour sympathies, a brief look at his selection of noteworthy films should disillusion us:

First on the list (most recently posted) is Anthony Eden (Con.) trying to put a noble gloss on British involvement in Suez:

postscript: a personal reply

More reflections on not judging and HRE

* * *

I think we don't stop communicating to send a message (or not only, and not necessarily), but more often because we reach a point where the communication has broken down - for whatever reason. It may be because communication has become difficult, disagreeable or pointless, more trouble than it's worth. It may be that wounds need mending, and communicating doesn't help that (for the moment); it may be that the gulf of understanding appears to be too large to cross; or that shared goals or values appear less obviously shared than once they did. Or it may be all of those - or other combinations.

One point I meant to raise by the post was that I believe people who 'refuse' to pass a judgement on dishonest or disreputable acts are nearly always doing so for pragmatic reasons. And yet - as you know - in the HRE community, the reasons given are more 'noble' sounding: 'we ought not to judge others', 'people deserve to be given a second chance', 'it is not for me to judge'. I think that is (often) disingenuous, and sometimes cowardly. So I wanted to say that there is an inconsistency between, on the one hand, our being willing (or being unable not) to judge our own acts according to certain moral standards; and on the other hand, being 'unwilling' to judge other peoples' acts by the same standards.

As far as that disagreement goes - a disagreement that I have with the HRE community - I can be 'tolerant': it is the sort of disagreement that I shall continue to argue about within the community (in so far as it lets me in), and shall continue to try to break down, because I think that the attitude is neither honest nor useful (always) in the field of HRE. But I am myself troubled by where the balance should be, and do not think it is always clear-cut whether we should take position 5 (turning a blind eye) or whether we should measure something against our own personal moral standards.

Then there's another disagreement that I have with (a particular!) HRE community (as you also know!), and where I do think that the line is pretty clear-cut. That disagreement is to do with whether a particular form of behaviour, an act of deliberate deceit for personal gain, continuously and strenuously denied, with damaging consequences for others, by someone in a position of trust and authority - by someone who even professes to be teaching others about values - whether that form of behaviour is indeed the sort that one should pass over, tut-tut a bit, but nothing more, forgive and forget, turn a blind eye. This disagreement is much more difficult to 'tolerate' - partly because I feel strongly that it isn't all of those things; partly because I feel disappointed that it was all of those things for those with whom I was supposed to be sharing values; and partly because as a result of that fundamental disagreement, I have ended up outside the community.

There are various possible (psychological) reactions to being 'rejected' by a community (or rejecting a community yourself?). But one of the most natural reactions must be to put up a defence: the community doesn't play by my rules, doesn't even agree with my rules, so I want no part of it. I want to be in a community which does share my values and priorities, so I shall look elsewhere.

So please, don't see it as a punishing act: see it as an act of complete incomprehension, disappointment and disillusionment; and for those reasons a breakdown in communication. Breakdowns in communication are difficult to bear for both sides of the divide.

not judging

more on this...

Measuring others according to moral standards becomes tormenting when (as is often the case) people you love and respect do things you cannot understand and would judge harshly if you had done them yourself. So can we avoid judging them (harshly), should we avoid judging them at all, or ought we to judge them just as we judge ourselves?

* * *

Suppose I judge the behaviour of the super-rich to be selfish and damaging to the structure of society, to the state of human rights around the world, to the potential for improvement and change, and to the system of predominant values. Then I suppose I have to judge friends or relations in that way too, if they approximate, or head towards the realm of the super-rich. There seem to be few other options.

Here are some possible let-outs:

1. Reverse my judgement

I could try to stop making the judgement at all - by trying to persuade myself to think as they do - that is (in this case), to believe that the super-rich have no negative impact on all those things; and that if individuals were to change their behaviour the world would not get better, but worse (or only stay the same). If I became able to persuade myself of all of that, presumably the judgement would cease to apply to myself (hypothetically) as well. In which case I could go and get as rich as I wished; could stop feeling guilty as I walked past homeless people in the street; could consider myself generous if I shared any part of my worldly goods with others; and could stop worrying that my hourly income might exceed the daily (monthly? annual?) income of people in other parts of the world.

I suspect that is the easiest path to take - I mean in terms of getting rid of the guilt and anger that can otherwise come to dominate one's life; and in terms of feeling better about oneself and feeling better about others. But it depends (in this case) on altering one's view of -

a) economics
b) personal responsibility (and guilt)
c) (I think) human nature.

So I need to look at all those 3 at some point...

Apart from that, and if I can't quite come to share their point of view on a), b) and c), or when it comes to other questions - how else do I react?

Perhaps I could isolate the 'judgement' so that it only applies to myself. For myself, it might be shaming to be super-rich, might 'feel' wrong, perhaps it might even be wrong: could it still be 'right' for others, or at least none of my business whether it is right or wrong?

Those are 2 different positions:

2. Different standards

'It is wrong for me but could be right for others'. In other words, different standards may apply to me - for example, because I am a different person, have different expectations and different possibilities for action. So according to this view: I cannot make a judgement on someone else's behaviour (because I don't know which standards to use)

This position is very suspect, although in a weak sense it is obviously true. As long as we make the standards general enough and put the bar high enough - for example: 'Torture is wrong', or even 'Deceit for personal gain is wrong' - then there is no earthly reason why they should not apply to everyone, as much as they apply to me. In fact there needs to be a very good reason why they should not apply to some particular person.

3. None of my business

'It is wrong for me, but I am in no position to judge whether it is right or wrong for others - because I cannot understand their point of view, because I am not them, and because it is not my role (right? responsibility?) to judge others.'

This is a cop-out: why is it not my role? It is obvious, again, if we take a universal standard, such as the case of torture, that on this issue, it is irrelevant why someone behaved in such a way: the act is still wrong. We do not need any further information in order to decide whether a torturer did the right thing or not (except, possibly, whether they can be said to have been forced to do it).

This non-committal stance has 2 close relations:

4. Judging the act but not the person

'What x did was wrong, very damaging, should never have been done... but I pass no judgement on x him/herself. The act was wrong but I make no claims about x, although s/he carried out the act deliberately and knowingly.'

Another cop-out - with the proviso that we should obviously be very careful about passing 'judgement' on people, and these should almost never be judgements extending beyond the concrete act, the specific instance on the basis of which they were drawn up. So, for example, we might say that x has a violent streak, as evidenced by the fact that s/he appeared to derive some satisfaction from applying torture on several occasions; but we would not want to say that x is bound always to be violent in all his/her activities and interrelations with other people (let alone that s/he is out-and-out evil).

5. Turning a blind eye

'It is wrong for me and may be wrong - or right - for others, but I am not going to make that judgement. I could make the judgement, quite justifiably, but I am not obliged to. I can shut my eyes to that issue (for example, in order to retain x as a friend, in order to keep my job, or in order not to stick my neck out and be judged for judging).'

This is my favoured position in cases of non-judging - the only one I think is really honest, and not too cowardly (as long as it is not applied universally). Perhaps, then, one could even apply that sort of reasoning towards oneself:

6. Never passing judgement

'I am not going to judge myself or others: what will be, will be; we do what we can and should not torment ourselves that we could not do otherwise. I shall not look at whether I or anyone else might have been able to act differently, and to different effect.'

This clearly goes too far, and is anyway disingenuous. I don't believe there are really people prepared to give up completely the moral discourse - which is what I think it amounts to.

* * *

The middle 3 positions seem to be common among the HRE-ers, to a lesser extent the last two as well. My suspicion is that in fact, those who are unwilling to look at other people's behaviour from a moral standpoint are nearly always doing so on according to the 5th position. In other words, although HRE-ers (and others) tend to hide behind positions 2 and 3, I think that what they are really doing is deliberately turning a blind eye (often in order not to stick their necks out, lose their jobs or - heaven forbid - appear to be moralistic and superior).

Position 5 is fine, and almost inevitable in certain cases - in fact I see it as the only hope of retaining our sanity and friends in a complex and corrupted world. But I wish people would be clear that they are refusing to make a judgement not because they think that moral standards cannot be applied to others, nor because they do not feel they ought to engage in moral evaluation - but because they want to retain friends, keep their jobs or not be seen as being judgemental. It is a personal and pragmatic choice, and not a moralistic one.

AN ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY

'...the fourth goal of our foreign policy is to secure the respect of other nations for Britain's contribution to keeping the peace of the world and promoting democracy around the world. The Labour Government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy and will publish an annual report on our work in promoting human rights abroad. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, May 1997

* * *

Nice People do Nasty Things

In fact, if you subscribe to the human rights faith, only Nice people do Nasty things. There are no non-Nice people.

That is not meant (for once) to be a dig at the HRE (or the human rights) community. Really. If you believe in human rights, then it only makes sense if every individual, whatever they do or have done, is still fundamentally human; still has fundamentally human emotions, reactions, desires, regrets, intentions, hopes, fears, and little bursts of irritation, admiration, inspiration and frustration; still tries to do good for his or her immediate circle; and possibly tries to Do Good in a wider sense as well.

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