Quotes by Mark Curtis
, in Unpeople
winning the war in afghanistan
Submitted by antarchi on April 23, 2011 - 13:39Soon after the British deployment to Helmand, in summer 2006, there was a major escalation in the conflict. The following year witnessed a further deterioration in the security situation, and by 2008 nearly half the country was effectively a no-go area for the international aid community.
One academic paper by two members of the UN mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, notes that ISAF’s military operations since 2001 have “pushed” anti-government elements “towards active insurgency”. During the four years of 2001-05, evidence suggests that the Afghan population largely supported the government. In 2006-07 public opinion began to shift in favour of anti-government elements in unstable areas, and by late 2008 the population was voluntarily providing support to anti-government forces...
A confidential August 2009 report by US General Stanley McChrystal, at that time the overall military commander in Afghanistan, stated that “the overall situation is deteriorating” and that NATO faced a “resilient and growing insurgency”.
The Taliban now has ‘shadow governors’ in 33 out of 34 Afghan provinces, and a permanent presence in 80% of the country. The NGO Safety Office, which advises organisations working in Afghanistan, describes the Taliban as “a movement anticipating authority and one which has already obtained a complex momentum that NATO will be incapable of reversing”
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why we're in afghanistan
Submitted by antarchi on April 23, 2011 - 13:31General Dannatt said in May 2009 that Britain’s “military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, have been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign”. Therefore, Dannatt continued, “Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal – and Afghanistan provides an opportunity”.
A confidential August 2009 report by US General Stanley McChrystal, at that time the overall military commander in Afghanistan, stated that “the overall situation is deteriorating” and that NATO faced a “resilient and growing insurgency”
British interests in the region are closely aligned with those of the USA:
“The entire region in which Afghanistan sits is of vital strategic importance to the United Kingdom,” stated the then Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth in July 2009.
UK Defence Minister Liam Fox MP has stated that a withdrawal of troops would “damage the credibility of NATO” and “would be a shot in the arm to violent jihadists everywhere, re-energising violent radical and extreme Islamism”.
General Dannatt said in May 2009 that Britain’s “military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, have been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign”. Therefore, Dannatt continued, “Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal – and Afghanistan provides an opportunity”.
US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, confirmed in 2007 that “one of our goals is to stabilise Afghanistan... so that energy can flow to the south”.
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business as usual in chile
Submitted by antarchi on May 29, 2008 - 19:52The files clearly show that British planners in Santiago and London totally welcomed the coup [in Chile] and immediately set about conducting good relations with the military rulers as repression increased, even secretly conniving with the junta to mislead the British public.
British officials were completely aware of the scale of atrocities. Three days after the coup, Ambassador Seconde reported to the Foreign Office that ‘it is likely that casualties run into the thousands, certainly it has been far from a bloodless coup’. Six days after, he noted that ‘stories of military excesses and mounting casualties have begun increasingly to circulate. The extent of the bloodshed has shocked people’.
welcoming the baath party
Submitted by antarchi on May 29, 2008 - 19:24The Baath party regime of 1968 was also immediately welcomed by Britain: ‘The new regime may look to the United Kingdom for military training and equipment and we should lose no time in appointing a defence attache’, the ambassador in Baghdad wrote. The regime’s new Defence Minister, General Tikriti, was invited to the Farnborough Air Show and was told by the ambassador that ‘it seemed to me we now had an opportunity to restore Anglo/Iraqi relations to something of their former intimacy’. In reply, ‘General Tikriti said that during the Ba’athist regime of 1963 he had greatly appreciated the cooperative attitude of HMG’.
arming mugabe
Submitted by antarchi on July 16, 2007 - 18:21The worst aspect was arming Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime had been a standard destination for British arms exports, including machine guns, ammunition and, in the 1980s and 1990s, around a dozen Hawk aircraft, with military training. The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that in the government's annual reports on arms exports for 1997 and 1998 'no indication was given... that any particular special [arms exports] regime was being applied to exports to Zimbabwe.
they need some bombing
Submitted by antarchi on July 3, 2007 - 02:03A senior US administration official told the media at Rambouillet that 'we intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing and that's what they are going to get'. The [UK] Foreign Affairs Committee concludes that:
One interpretation of the oral evidence given us by FCO officials is that they never really believed that Milosevic would sign at Rambouillet, but that...'we had to go through a process', presumably with the aim of promoting unity amoung the international community in favour of military action by showing that Milosevic was unwilling to negotiate...
compelling but not conclusive
Submitted by antarchi on June 16, 2007 - 03:32For almost a year after Halabja Whitehall refused to concede that Iraq had definitely used chemical weapons, stating that the evidence was 'compelling but not conclusive'.

