Wikileaks: Hamas, Fatah, Gaza

Submitted by antarchi on January 3, 2011 - 02:20

A few extracts. The 2nd and 3rd cables, from Jun 2007, seem to put in question a view I've heard from a number of sources - that the US / Israel supported Fatah (militarily) to take over in Gaza. Or maybe I'm not good enough at reading between the lines of diplomatic cables.

(all emphasis mine)

This one, from Apr 2007, makes clear that there was a strategy for 'regime change', but it was economic:

CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION LEADER BINYAMIN NETANYAHU:

Bring Down Hamas [Original heading in US cable]
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¶5. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked Netanyahu for his views on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu said Abbas was a "nice man who means well," but he added that Israel and the U.S. should focus on "bringing down Hamas" through an "economic squeeze." Netanyahu asserted that eight months ago, the Hamas government had been on the brink of collapse, but had become stronger because Israel became weaker as a result of the Lebanon war. Without elaborating, Netanyahu said it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthen Abbas.

...

Netanyahu predicted that Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an "economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas would receive the popular blame.

...

¶7. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked if Abbas would survive politically. Netanyahu said he was unsure, since politics were stressful, especially Palestinian politics. The policy, he added, should be to starve the NUG. If any money is given, it should go directly to Abbas. Netanyahu said it was not clear the GOI has a policy, there was a general climate of weakness.

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Cable 07TELAVIV1732, ISA CHIEF DISKIN ON SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP

[Israeli Security Agency (ISA) Head Yuval] Diskin noted that he had heard earlier on June 11 from Palestinian sources that Hamas had succeeded in stealing some Doshka" heavy machine guns from the Presidential Guard. He said that this is an example of why he does not support "at this time" USSC LTG Dayton's proposal to supply ammunition and weapons to Fatah: "I support the idea of militarily strengthening Fatah, but I am afraid that they are not organized to ensure that the equipment that is transferred to them will reach the intended recipients."

...

Diskin continued: "Fatah is in very bad shape in the Gaza Strip. We have received requests to train their forces in Egypt and Yemen. We would like them to get the training they need, and to be more powerful, but they do not have anyone to lead them." Diskin also made clear his reservations on training Palestinians in a country like Yemen with a strong Al-Qaida presence.

...

¶6. (S) Diskin's aide said that the security forces at the Rafah crossing are strong, but are demoralized with the overall situation in the Gaza Strip. Diskin added that their communications with the ISA had become desperate," and indicated no hope for the future. He observed that there is a young generation of leaders among Fatah who are being "pushed" by Dahlan and who have a sense of the urgency of the situation and what needs to be done. At the same time, however, they are not behaving in a way that is to be expected by people in their urgent situation. Diskin observed, "They are approaching a zero-sum situation, and yet they ask us to attack Hamas. This is a new development. We have never seen this before. They are desperate."

...

7. (S) In the West Bank, Diskin said that ISA has established a very good working relationship with the Preventive Security Organization (PSO) and the General Intelligence Organization (GIO). Diskin said that the PSO shares with ISA almost all the intelligence that it collects. They understand that Israel's security is central to their survival in the struggle with Hamas in the West Bank.

4. (S) In response to the Ambassador's question, Yadlin said he did not think that day's Hamas attacks on Fatah security forces were part of a premeditated effort to wipe out Fatah in Gaza. Instead, they probably represented an initiative of the military wing with the tacit consent of Khalid Mishal in Damascus. Mishal was still considering the costs and benefits of the fighting, but the situation had become so tense that any incident could lead to street fighting without any political decision.

5. (S) The Ambassador asked Yadlin for his assessment of reports that Fatah forces had been ordered not to fight back. Yadlin said Mohammed Dahlan had 500 men and the Presidential Guard had 1,500 more. They understand that the balance of power favors Hamas, which "can take over Gaza any time it wants to." Yadlin said he would be surprised if Fatah fights, and even more surprised if they win. As far as he was concerned, this had been the case for the past year...

6. (S) The Ambassador commented that if Fatah decided it has lost Gaza, there would be calls for Abbas to set up a separate regime in the West Bank. While not necessarily reflecting a consensus GOI view, Yadlin commented that such a development would please Israel since it would enable the IDF to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal with Hamas as a non-state actor. He added that Israel could work with a Fatah regime in the West Bank. The Ambassador asked Yadlin if he worried about a Hamas-controlled Gaza giving Iran a new opening. Yadlin replied that Iran was already present in Gaza, but Israel could handle the situation "as long as Gaza does not have a port (sea or air)."

...

9. (S) Comment: Yadlin's relatively relaxed attitude toward the deteriorating security situation in Gaza represents a shift in IDF thinking from last fall, when the Southern Command supported a major ground operation into Gaza to remove the growing threat from Hamas. While many media commentators continue to make that argument, Yadlin's view appears to be more in synch with that of Chief of General Staff Ashkenazi, who also believes that the more serious threat to Israel currently comes from the north.

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Recognition of Israel

CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER BARAK

6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers from both.

...Hamas "for sure," [Amir] said, will accept the 1967 border but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.

...

Cable 10DOHA71, SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER

6. (C) HBJ [Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani] noted that in conversations Qatar has held with Hamas' leadership, it is clear that Hamas is ready to accept Israel's right to exist. But the acceptance must come about gradually, not in one day.